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Abstract 
 
How can organizations put dynamic capabilities into practice? We focus on the 
power of organizational design, showing how managers can harness new 
organizational forms to build a capacity for sensing, shaping and seizing 
opportunities. Fast-moving environments favor open organization and self-
organizing processes that quickly convert individual capabilities into actionable 
collective intellect. We argue that self-organizing processes do not organize 
themselves but require managers to design and execute them. We examine new 
design principles – such as polyarchy, social proofs, and new forms of open 
organization – that allow organizations to build dynamic capabilities for 
sustained innovation in dynamic environments. 
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 3 
Introduction  
     Valve Corporation was founded in 1996 by Gabe Newell and Mike Harrington, former 
Microsoft employees. Valve began as a video game company, producing best sellers such as 
Half Life and Portal. Later the company evolved into a digital distribution platform, known for 
products such as Steam and SourceForge. Their self-reported revenues per employee and profit 
per employee exceed those of Facebook and Google. 
     Valve has succeeded in a fast moving environment that requires constant agility, strategic 
innovation and market adaptation – precisely the kind of environment that places dynamic 
capabilities at a premium. And how did they develop and harness these capabilities?  
     According to interviews we conducted at Valve, the secret to their success is organizational 
design, the principles of which are embedded in the company’s Handbook for New Employees.1 
Here are some quotes from the Handbook:  
     “The company is yours to steer – toward opportunities and away from risks. You have the 
power to green-light projects. You have the power to ship products.” 
     “You were not hired to fill a specific job description. You were hired to constantly be 
looking around for the most valuable work you could be doing.” 
     “We’ve heard that other companies have people allocate a percentage of their time to self-
directed projects. At Valve, that percentage is 100.” 
     We learned in our interviews that the company constantly reinforces these principles by 
providing resources and support to put them into practice. For example, employees are allowed 
to choose their own projects, recruit people to those projects, and initiate new products or 
platforms without higher approval.  
     Valve, which we will examine in more detail, illustrates the core theme of our paper: that 
organizational design is the crucial enabler of dynamic capabilities. Valve’s founders knew from 
experience at Microsoft, some of it hard-earned, that the company could not succeed without 
staying at the forefront of market innovation. They also knew that successful innovation 
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depended on their capacity to harness individual and team initiative, and that traditional forms 
of organizational design – functional silos, top-down hierarchical structures, routinized formal 
processes – could stifle creativity, initiative and market responsiveness. Hence, they turned to 
alternative forms of organizational architecture – a unique blend of polyarchy, social proofs, 
self-organizing teams and open organization – to release the creative power of teams and 
individuals. By attending to organizational design and day to day execution, Valve built a 
capacity for sensing, shaping and seizing market opportunities.  
 
Dynamic Capabilities 
     Many industries are subject to rapid technological change, market entry from global 
innovators, and volatility in market demand. Companies that cannot anticipate or respond to 
external disruption are unlikely to survive. In volatile industries, organizations need strategies, 
structures and processes that enable agility and responsiveness in a shifting competitive 
landscape.   
     The theory of dynamic capabilities came about as an attempt to explain competitive 
advantage in volatile industries. As the 20th century came to a close, internet-based technologies 
altered the competitive landscape across a broad range of market sectors, raising new challenges 
to conventional views of competitive advantage. The success of companies like Apple, Amazon, 
Google, and Facebook showed that a capacity to sense, shape and seize opportunities could 
revolutionize industries and transform national and global economies.2  
     In volatile markets, the functional and operational routines that drive competitive success in 
stable conditions – “baseline” capabilities such as supply chain management and access to 
distribution channels – become subject to rapid obsolescence. Even if a company’s advantages 
are inimitable due to experience or proprietary knowledge, disruptive technologies and business 
models can undermine the underlying drivers of industry advantage, making conventional 
advantages irrelevant or out of step with market conditions and customer requirements.  
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     The dynamic capabilities view of competitive advantage argues that success in volatile 
industries requires higher-order capabilities that enable companies to anticipate, shape, and 
adapt to shifting competitive landscapes. The dynamic capabilities view accepts the importance 
of capabilities like product design and manufacturing, but argues that success in volatile 
industries requires something more than baseline capabilities: namely, adaptive processes and 
structures that enable companies to change their baseline capabilities, anticipate shifts in market 
demand, develop and integrate new technologies, learn from market events, and foresee and 
capture new market opportunities. 
     The competitive landscape of the 21st century may or may not be more turbulent than the 
world of the past – the point is debatable.3 But it is certain that the old tools of organizational 
design – hierarchy, chains of command, functional areas, formal reporting, long-term planning – 
are not well-suited to success in volatile markets. Competitive advantage in these markets 
requires a higher-order capacity to sense, shape and seize new market opportunities.4 This 
means that continuous improvement of existing capabilities is not enough, but that 
organizations need an overarching capacity for developing new capabilities that anticipate and 
respond to a turbulent marketplace. Perhaps it is not surprising that a few pioneering companies 
have experimented with new organizational architectures, discovering new structures and 
processes suited to continuous innovation. 
 
Individual and Collective Capabilities 
     Volatile environments place stringent demands on information processing in organizations. 
For an organization to sense, shape and seize opportunities, it must somehow obtain and 
process current and reliable information. As organizational sociologist Arthur Stinchombe 
wrote, “If organizations have to deal with uncertainties, then someplace in the organization 
there have to be people who bring information to bear on those uncertainties.”5  
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     But who are those people? Who in an organization possesses enough information, 
knowledge and capability to cope with the uncertainties that arise in turbulent competitive 
environments? Who fully grasps the latest changes in customer preferences, social media 
chatter, threats to the company’s supply chains, or innovations of actual and potential 
competitors? Who understands the economic and social consequences of national political 
debates, global military conflicts, demographic shifts, government policies, digital technologies, 
global health crises, and climate change?  
     The short answer is: no one. Many chief executives keep a finger on the pulse of political 
debates and general competitive dynamics, and this may be possible even in volatile 
environments. But CEOs are poorly placed to keep a close eye on fast-moving developments in 
social media, product and process technologies, and customer preferences, and to make 
unbiased inferences about their consequences. Other people in (and beyond) the organization – 
scientists in the lab, salespeople in the field, overseas manufacturing managers, customer service 
representatives in branch offices, contract consultants, customers themselves – have better 
information and knowledge, more specialized training, and a finer-grained appreciation of 
movements on the ground in their domains. 
     Therefore, the first challenge in designing organizations for dynamic capabilities is to capture 
what is already there – information, knowledge, experience, capabilities – and to bring it all to 
bear on collective decision making. As Kenneth Arrow pointed out, an organization can 
“acquire more information than any individual.”6 In organizational decision making, each 
individual has some unique information but no individual has enough information to make 
collective decisions. The task of the organizational designer, both in concept and practice, is to 
design structures that put individuals in contact with their relevant environments, and to design 
processes that facilitate learning, sharing and aggregation of individual knowledge so that the 
collective organization can make well-informed decisions. 
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     This task presents special problems in volatile industries, with consequences for the design 
of strategies, structures and processes. The most common error companies make is trying to 
have it both ways, giving lip service to innovation and decision autonomy, while retaining 
bureaucratic processes and reward systems that perpetuate old ways of thinking. Sadly, most 
organizations talk a better game of design innovation than they actually play, and few are willing 
to sacrifice the centralized controls that perpetuate cognitive and social inertia. This leads to 
misalignments that deflate internal culture and stifle innovation – the well-known folly of 
rewarding A while hoping for B.7  
     At the other extreme, a company can go too far in flattening the organization and giving full 
decision autonomy to unaccountable individuals at the organization’s boundaries. A company 
that adopts this approach indiscriminately, without proper systems for converting individual 
knowledge into collective intellect, is liable to spin completely out of control. 
     Designing organizations for dynamic capabilities presents new challenges for managers and 
entrepreneurs. Because these challenges arise from empirical events in real-world environments, 
they are hands-on challenges, not theoretical ones. Indeed, the theoretical problem was well-
stated long ago by 20th century organization theorists: How can we map the organization onto 
the full diversity of its environment (“differentiation”), while employing structures, processes 
and systems (“integrating mechanisms”) that prevent the organization from disintegrating into 
chaos?8 As these theorists pointed out, there are many possible solutions to this problem: 
mechanistic or “machine” organizations for stable environments, organic forms or 
“adhocracies” for unstable environments, and mixed forms suitable for other conditions. 
     These theories remain relevant and insightful. However, they do not give managers the 
practical tool they need to design organizations for dynamic capabilities.9 This is because many 
of the manufacturing and service industries that formed the empirical base for these theories 
declined after the 1970s; and what came after – the global, volatile, technology-driven 
information economy – gave rise to new kinds of design problems. The forms of market 
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volatility emerging in recent years require organizations to differentiate their structures globally 
rather than domestically, digitally as well as mechanically, virtually as well as physically, 
continuously rather than occasionally. This requires organizations to think more cohesively 
about the links between strategy and structure, designing flexible mechanisms for structural 
differentiation and integration that enable the development of dynamic capabilities. It is no 
longer a matter of “structure follows strategy” or “strategy follows structure” but of 
continuously orchestrating strategies and structures that enable the sensing, shaping and seizing 
of market opportunities. In the next section we discuss the organizational mechanisms that have 
begun to emerge, and illustrate them using Valve Corporation and other examples. 
 
Design Tools for Dynamic Capabilities 
     Figure 1 illustrates the basic problem described in the last section. New environments 
require companies to find new solutions to the problem of market volatility. Companies must 
establish information-absorbing teams and individual specialists at or beyond the boundaries of 
the organization, and give these people real autonomy to solve problems and capture 
opportunities. A company that fails to differentiate its internal structure will fall into traps of 
insularity or folly (see Figure 1), finding it impossible to respond to fast-changing environments.  
 
– INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
     At the same time, companies must bring together the knowledge and capabilities that sit with 
individuals and teams to achieve the shared purposes of the collective enterprise. Companies 
that differentiate but do not integrate – perhaps in the belief that autonomy is self-organizing – 
face the perils of organizational chaos. These kinds of organizations can produce great ideas, 
but lack the means to implement or commercialize them in the marketplace. 
     This brings us back to the central questions of the paper: What are the mechanisms of 
structural differentiation and integration that enable organizations to create dynamic capabilities 
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in volatile environments? How can companies increase collective intellect and achieve shared 
goals without stifling the creative autonomy of empowered teams and individuals?  
     To address these questions, we return to Valve Corporation and describe the two primary 
mechanisms they employed – polyarchy and social proofs – to achieve a balance of 
differentiation and integration in a dynamic environment.   
     Differentiation by Polyarchy. In political science, the term “polyarchy” refers to a system 
of government in which power is widely distributed to many individuals. The opposite of 
polyarchy is autocracy, with power residing in a single person; and there are many intermediate 
forms, including representative democracy.10 In economics and organization theory, scholars 
have discussed polyarchy in the context of flat or decentralized forms of organization in which 
autonomous individuals are empowered to make significant choices about the nature and scope 
of their own work.11 
     Like every form of governance, polyarchy has advantages and disadvantages, and is better 
suited to some conditions than others.12 As a guiding principle for the internal organization of 
companies, it has the advantage of giving authority to those who operate closest to the action.13 
It gives autonomy to specialized individuals and sub-units at the boundaries of an enterprise, 
thereby facilitating local creativity, experimentation, and innovation, while minimizing 
bureaucratic impediments to project approval and implementation. As such, polyarchy prepares 
the ground for dynamic capabilities by enabling people to sense, shape and seize new 
opportunities. 
     In traditional terms, polyarchy can be seen as a form of radical decentralization – not a mere 
flattening of organization structure, but bestowing full autonomy of judgment, decision and 
execution to decentralized individuals and subunits. In recent years, many technology and 
internet-based companies have adopted elements of polyarchy, for example in software 
development (companies like Menlo Innovations and Basecamp), and online retail (the shoe 
retailer Zappos). Even larger and more established companies have conducted partial 
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experiments with polyarchy, especially in R&D-intensive industries – for example, Google and 
3M give employees a percentage of free time to develop their own projects. Limited polyarchy 
can also be found in traditional industries like foods and consumer products (for example, at 
Morning Star, which produces tomato paste),14 and in knowledge-intensive industries like 
professional services and academia.15  
     At Valve Corporation, polyarchy is the driving principle of structural differentiation. As part 
of its core values, the company deliberately seeks to build dynamic capabilities for sensing, 
shaping and seizing new market opportunities. The aim of structural differentiation at Valve is 
to go beyond traditional decentralization and empowerment by giving full release to the market 
potential of talented specialists in product research, design and engineering. To this end, the 
company gives individuals full autonomy to propose projects, recruit project teams, establish 
budgets, set timelines, and ship products to customers.  
     A good example of this is the Valve product platform called Steam, designed for digital 
distribution, digital rights management, broadcasting and social networking. The Steam project 
did not come from top-down processes like competitive analysis, formal market research, and 
the capital investment and budgeting cycle. Rather, a few creative individuals at the 
organization’s boundaries saw that their latest ideas about video software mapped onto a 
potential market opportunity. They floated these ideas with potential users, pitched them to 
other Valve employees, recruited talent onto a project team for design and execution, and 
ultimately produced one of the industry’s most innovative and successful platforms (75% of all 
games downloaded onto PCs are now sold through Steam.).16 Compared with top-down R&D 
processes, Valve’s polyarchical approach delivered improved consumer engagement, project 
team motivation, and speed to market.  
     Polyarchy starts at the point of employee selection. Recruitment processes at Valve do not 
focus on hiring into particular jobs with fixed job descriptions, but on finding people with the 
capacity to create value in a marketplace of ideas. The question is not whether the candidate can 
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learn the rules, write reports, and work within the requirements of a functional role, but how 
well they can thrive when given the resources and freedom to identify and create a new market 
opportunity. At Valve, the criteria for selection relate directly to the formation of dynamic 
capabilities – that is, the company selects for the ability to sense, shape and seize new market 
opportunities.  
     The Handbook plays a crucial role in guiding people in the search for new projects, and in 
deciding which project teams to join. Rather than telling people what to do, the Handbook poses 
questions: 
1. Of all the projects currently under way, what’s the most valuable thing I can be 
working on? 
 
2. Which project will have the highest direct impact on our customers?  How much will 
the work I ship benefit them? 
 
3. Is Valve not doing something that it should be doing?  
 
4. What’s interesting? What’s rewarding? What leverages my individual strengths the 
most?    
 
     The responsibility for sensing, shaping and seizing opportunities does not rest with the top 
management team, or with a marketing group or R&D department, but with all employees. As 
might be expected, individual rewards and incentives at Valve Corporation are closely tied to 
idea generation, project success and market outcomes. A crucial element of remuneration and 
performance review is a system of peer evaluation, in which people and project teams are 
ranked by their peers based on measures of innovation, contribution and value creation. Hence, 
the company is giving more than lip service to the concept of empowerment. According to 
Valve’s founders, skilled programmers and systems engineers are often undervalued in the labor 
market, in part because so many companies in North America and Europe have offshored core 
engineering activities, leaving capable engineers underemployed. The founders sought talented 
engineers who could thrive when empowered to create and implement new ideas, backed by a 
compensation and incentive system that rewards individual initiative and market innovation.   
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     Valve employs a number of mechanisms to encourage and guide the creative forces 
unleashed by radical decentralization. However, these are not the traditional mechanisms of 
formal controls, operating procedures, plans, reporting, or even organization culture. Instead, 
Valve achieves structural integration through a set of mechanisms that can be classified broadly 
as “social proofs.” As shown in the next section, the most important of these are self-selection 
and social convergence.   
     Integration by Social Proofs. In social psychology, a social proof is any mechanism of 
social influence that tends to produce coordinated behavior among individuals. The nature of 
social proofs is to induce a kind of social contagion in which beliefs, preferences, and practices 
disseminate through a population of individuals.17 There is no suggestion that social proofs 
always produce positive outcomes, and indeed many mechanisms of social influence are known 
to produce dysfunctional outcomes such as groupthink, group polarization, conformity, herd 
behavior, and the madness of crowds.18 
     Nonetheless, companies like Valve have found that social proofs form an effective counter-
balance to the extreme differentiation of polyarchy. The strength of polyarchy is its capacity to 
devolve decision authority to the individuals with the greatest information, experience, 
expertise, and incentives to achieve. What it lacks is coordination with colleagues or 
accountability to the company as a whole, and this is what social proofs are designed to provide. 
A purposeful system of social proofs, applied in a polyarchy of talented and well-resourced 
individuals, can provide an effective counterweight to the chaotic tendencies of extreme 
differentiation.  
     The primary mechanism of social proofs is self-selection. At Valve Corporation, people 
choose their own projects and vote with their feet. They assess markets for new opportunities, 
gather information about existing projects and teams, and make their own judgments about 
whether to affiliate with existing teams or form their own projects. This does not mean that 
everyone makes optimal choices, or that social biases or politics are absent; indeed, people 
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actively try to persuade others to join their project teams. However, experience at Valve 
suggests that the aggregate choices of individually-empowered experts contain a powerful signal 
about the future direction of the marketplace – a form of collective wisdom that serves as a 
barometer and guide to the strategic direction of the enterprise.19 Even if the signal contains 
social noise, Valve managers believe that self-selection yields more reliable and lower cost 
information, and faster market responsiveness, than traditional controls and incentives. 
     Self-selection empowers the right people to make decisions, but cannot alone overcome the 
problems that arise in polyarchies in their purest form – for example, cost inefficiencies and 
duplication of effort.20 Valve executives did not want to impair individual initiative by requiring 
layers of project approval, but they had learned from experience that one or two individuals, no 
matter how talented, could not command enough information or resources to sense, shape and 
seize a large-scale market opportunity.  
     To solve this problem, Valve’s founders devised a method of social convergence they called 
the “rule of three,” a novel solution that harnessed individuals’ capacities to sense and seize 
opportunities while providing behavioral incentives to coordinate activity and minimize 
inefficiency. According to this rule, one or two people acting alone could not move a project 
forward, but a group of three could receive a green light. This allowed project teams to tap into 
company resources and the “wisdom of crowds” for designing and delivering significant 
products, while giving decision makers a clear and implementable “tipping point” for project 
investment decisions.21 As a principle of social convergence, the “rule of three” offers a 
relatively light-touch intervention that allows the company both to stimulate innovation and to 
bring the chaos of polyarchy under control, a solution reminiscent of David Teece’s comment 
on innovation in Silicon Valley: “let chaos reign, then rein in chaos.” 22 
     New market innovations seldom present themselves as obvious opportunities for capital 
investment, and do not come with fully-formed business models for implementation. Design 
tools such as self-selection and the “rule of three” incentivize people not only to sense new 
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opportunities, but to shape those opportunities through social processes of bargaining, 
influence and recruitment. New strategies and business models emerge and evolve as individuals 
compete for resources and challenge each other over the definition, scale, scope and 
implementation of proposed innovations. This is not the case when social proofs are absent, 
especially in pure polyarchies where individuals are fully empowered to act on perceived market 
opportunities. Social proofs like self-selection and the “rule of three” serve as valuable filtering 
and enabling devices that redefine and transform new ideas, shaping market opportunities in the 
crucial period before the company makes significant strategic commitments. 
     Valve is not the only company to use polyarchy and social proofs to capture the “wisdom of 
crowds.” For example, the Danish hearing aid manufacturer Oticon experimented with a similar 
combination of polyarchy and social proofs, using internal markets or “market-hierarchy 
hybrids” to produce the spontaneous order of self-organized project teams. As Nicolai Foss 
pointed out from a transaction cost perspective, the organizational designs of companies like 
Oticon replace the visible hand of management with the invisible hand of social proofs, 
substituting social markets for structural hierarchies.23  
     The combination of polyarchy and social proofs can also be found in creative industries and 
project-based environments. In Hollywood, for example, movie ideas and production processes 
are generally driven by flat, emergent structures.24 Unlike the studio culture of the 1930s – in 
which powerful studio heads exercised firm control over people, contracts and projects – 
modern film-making is a breeding ground for polyarchy and social proofs, with diverse groups 
of talented people empowered to develop new ideas, raise capital and greenlight projects.25   
     Some of these innovations in organizational design have been adapted to the contexts of 
larger organizations and more stable industries. Google’s uses of flat organization and various 
aspects of polyarchy and social proofs are well established.26 Michael Tushman and colleagues 
have documented how IBM found ways to empower individuals to sense potential market 
opportunities, linking individual and team initiative with corporate culture and reward systems. 
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Though IBM did not achieve this through Valve-like social proofs (such as the “rule of three”), 
managers linked the activities of specific functional areas to the sensing of new opportunities 
and to the execution of strategies for capturing these opportunities. According to Tushman and 
colleagues, this approach transformed IBM’s culture and practices, allowing the company to 
“sense changes in the marketplace and to seize the opportunities by reconfiguring existing assets 
and competencies.”27  
     For creating dynamic capabilities, the new market-hierarchy hybrids have a number of 
advantages.28 A key advantage is that the ebb and flow of collective preferences allows everyone 
in the enterprise, not only top managers, to monitor and influence the strategic direction of the 
company; or, as Valve tells its employees, “the company is yours to steer.” Because social 
convergence drives major investment decisions, individuals track the internal grapevine closely 
and develop keen sensitivities to social thresholds. This has the effect of intensifying 
communication and increasing overall strategic transparency. As evolved social actors, people 
seem to know intuitively when an idea has reached the required threshold of social support, or 
“tipping point.” When this happens in a polyarchy, the pace of events accelerates and a critical 
mass of resources rapidly converges on the idea. Interestingly, this heightened sensitivity to 
social thresholds is also a common feature of animal behavior, where “quorum sensing” has 
been shown to produce better collective outcomes than other decision processes (see Sidebar: 
Quorum Sensing).29  
     The combination of polyarchy and social proof also has the useful property of decoupling 
the sensing of market opportunities from the seizing of them. Research on creativity suggests 
that discovery and idea-generation are better performed by individuals than by groups, which 
use interactive processes such as brainstorming that are subject to a host of behavioral and 
social biases (such as anchoring, status relationships, formal authority and groupthink). 
However, the evaluation and choice of ideas – the seizing of opportunities – is better 
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accomplished when people consider diverse perspectives, which is facilitated by social 
interaction and the mechanism of self-selection.30  
     Social proofs allow firms to maximize individual and social cognition. At Valve Corporation, 
the sensing of opportunities rests largely with expert individuals at the interface of the 
organization and its potential markets; as we have seen, this is facilitated by polyarchy. The 
seizing of opportunities, however, depends on the ability of one or more individuals to recruit 
people and resources by establishing the external legitimacy of their ideas. This is the role of 
social proofs, and involves sub-processes such as pitching, recruiting, bargaining, and consensus 
building. These sub-processes buffer the organization from poor investment decisions by 
providing a rigorous competitive test of social legitimacy before resources are fully committed. 
     Social proofs also serve as partial countermeasures against individual cognitive biases.31 
Research in behavioral strategy shows that individuals exhibit a large number of cognitive 
decision biases, such as overconfidence, wishful thinking, confirmation bias, and loss aversion.32 
Most cognitive biases are hardwired, unconscious and unintended, and resist remedies at the 
individual level regardless of knowledge or awareness.33 However, as urged by Thaler and 
Sunstein and others, individual biases can be mitigated by organizational designs and social 
architectures that constrain individual biases, or make them less harmful in their effects.34 For 
example, organizations can design decision processes that require managers to consider a range 
of strategic options rather than anchoring on a favored solution; or require participation 
according to expertise and experience rather than by rank and authority.  
     Organizational designs based on polyarchy and social proofs embed a number of potential 
countermeasures to individual cognitive biases. For example, polyarchy encourages companies 
to consider not only the favored options of influential top managers but a range of options 
derived from diverse sources, and social proofs encourage companies to consider ideas on their 
merits in a competitive marketplace of ideas, not according to the biases of select individuals 
constrained by loss aversion, confirmation bias and inertia. The sub-processes that drive social 
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proofs – pitching, recruiting, bargaining, consensus building – concentrate activity on project 
advocacy by subject experts, rather than on the preferences of authority figures. The sensitivity 
to social thresholds, or “quorum sensing,” directs attention to external market signals and away 
from the predispositions of individuals. The involvement of external stakeholders encourages an 
“outside view” of the organization as a counterbalance to internal decision myopia.35 Although 
few remedies can overturn hardwired executive biases or social biases deeply embedded in 
decision processes, the new market-leaning structures promote a psychological architecture that 
helps companies “nudge” individual and social cognition into more productive channels. 
 
Open Sensing, Shaping and Seizing 
     In stable environments, executives rely on experience, routines, learning, and scale effects to 
build baseline capabilities in functional areas like marketing and manufacturing. In volatile 
markets, however, organizational structures that protect and exploit current strengths can foster 
strategic inertia, or lure the company into “competency traps” in which they build increasing 
capabilities in things that no longer matter.36 To develop the core processes that support 
dynamic capabilities – sensing, shaping and seizing – executives cannot manage solely by 
routines, systems, incentives and impersonal structural mechanisms. Instead, they must learn to 
rely on the characteristics and judgments of people, as they work individually, in groups, and 
toward the aims of the collective enterprise.37 
     Organizational architectures based on polyarchy and social proofs enable individuals and 
groups to build higher-order capabilities for sensing, shaping and seizing opportunities. Self-
selected team members engage more directly with organizational projects, and social proofs 
incentivize communication and coordination. The new designs give individuals the resources 
and incentives they need to build individual and joint capabilities, not only in technical areas like 
programming, computation, and systems engineering, but in softer skills such as 
communicating, managing conflict, and making sound judgments under uncertainty.38 Sustained 
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attention to market opportunities maximizes individual and collective market knowledge, while 
enhancing the capacity both to interpret that knowledge and put it into action.  
     In the most effective polyarchies, the processes of sensing, shaping and seizing do not stop 
at the boundaries of the organization. Instead of fine-tuning internal functional area capabilities, 
companies like Valve excel in discovering opportunities that require the company to expand its 
repertoire of capabilities by opening up to forces beyond its own formal boundaries. To achieve 
this, the organization maintains porous boundaries that facilitate the free flow of information to 
and from the marketplace.  
     This means engaging with external stakeholders through open forms of innovation that 
invite customers and other actual and potential stakeholders into the company’s learning and 
innovation processes.39 Crowdsourcing, for example, allows companies to engage external 
stakeholders in collaborative innovation.40 In its simplest form, crowdsourcing involves 
soliciting ideas directly from customers, for example by establishing online user communities in 
which customers critique existing products or contribute new product ideas.41 User communities 
engage external stakeholders as partners in sensing and shaping new market opportunities. By 
giving companies faster access to market data and new product ideas, crowdsourcing allows 
companies to find new market niches and serve customers better, while reducing search costs 
and time to market.42 
     Innovation contests provide another way of engaging external crowds.43 In dynamic 
environments, companies often do not know whether their problems are solvable or what kinds 
of expertise are required. Jeppesen and Lakhani argued that innovation contests represent a 
form of “broadcast search” in which companies pose problems for external constituents to 
solve.44 By broadcasting the problem to targeted external crowds, the company gains access to a 
large and well-informed population from which individuals, motivated by the prospect of a 
monetary prize, can self-select to provide potential solutions.  
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     Some companies take crowdsourcing much further, inviting customers not only to sense and 
shape opportunities, but to seize them. For example, Valve’s Steam platform currently features 
more than 400 million pieces of user-generated content, and serves as an iTunes-type platform 
on which geographically-distributed users or developers can sell or freely distribute 
complementary products to consumers. For its role in managing this activity, Valve collects 
licensing and transaction fees. Valve also allows players to receive micropayments for adding 
new game levels or creating new in-game products. In this way, Valve facilitates the co-creation 
of market innovations, while extending its own dynamic capabilities in sensing, shaping and 
seizing opportunities. 
     Valve also brings stakeholders into the development process by acting as curator for the 
preferences of its user communities. On the Steam platform, the company facilitates discussions 
among the user community that determine which games are developed and listed. Developers 
can post trial versions of new software products, and users can vote and approve the ones they 
like (called Valve Greenlight). Valve also offers a tool called Steam Workshop that facilitates 
match-making and collaboration between game developers and consumers. Through such 
mechanisms, Valve continuously senses and seizes new market opportunities, collaborating with 
stakeholders to build dynamic capabilities. 
     In some markets, crowdsourcing provides not only the ideas, but the resources for 
implementing innovations. Many entrepreneurs have employed crowdfunding to launch 
successful ventures, often using intermediaries like Kickstarter, which connects entrepreneurs 
with potential investors. Crowdfunding gives under-resourced entrepreneurs both a seizing 
mechanism for capturing market opportunities, and a form of external social proof for 
legitimizing their market innovations.45        
     The rapid dissemination of crowdsourcing – from technology companies like Valve to 
diversified consumer goods companies like PepsiCo, which used crowdsourcing to choose its 
Super Bowl ads – suggests that the range of organizations that can benefit from open 
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organization is broader than most people realized. At the same time, this dissemination suggests 
that organizations cannot count on open organization alone, any more than on traditional 
structures, to deliver sustained competitive advantage. Organizational innovators are constantly 
developing new architectures and dynamic capabilities, and combining them with new strategies 
and technologies. In a connected world, every company faces potentially disruptive innovations 
in its competitive markets, supply chains or distribution channels. This means that a company 
like PepsiCo can learn something about organizational architecture from a company like Valve. 
     The market conditions of 21st century competition demand less directive and more open 
forms of organization. These are not the same organizational designs proposed in theories of 
“organic” or “adhocratic” organization, but designs suited to the current state of technology, 
global competition and social demography. Companies like Valve Corporation have led the way 
in developing these designs, and in exploring their consequences for market innovation. As 
companies continue to co-evolve their strategies with new customers and technologies, they will 
face ever-increasing pressures for innovation, not only in dynamic capabilities, but in the 
organizational designs for putting them into practice.  
 
Conclusions 
     It would be wrong to suggest that a company like Valve Corporation has got everything 
figured out. Valve competes in volatile industries and risky product segments, and nearly all of 
these markets experience high mortality rates. We can learn from Valve, but not as a case study 
of invulnerability. The real learning takes place when executives use examples like Valve to gain 
a new perspective on their own companies, and to adopt strategies and organizational designs 
better suited to the realities of their own environments (see Sidebar: Putting Dynamic 
Capabilities into Practice). 
     For most entrepreneurs and managers, we believe the lessons of contemporary 
organizational design are threefold. First, although open organizational architectures may seem 
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like a frightening prospect to many executives, they are not impossible to achieve. Executives 
may think that open organization is risky, like riding a bicycle down a mountain with no hands. 
But executives at companies like Valve would argue that the new architectures are less risky than 
trying to relegate sensing, shaping and seizing to a small number of high-level executives. This, 
they might say, is like using training wheels in an Olympic bicycle race. For most organizations, 
the solution lies somewhere in-between: companies that give new forms of empowerment to 
their people can experience the rewards of innovation, but they must balance empowerment 
with the guiding hand of social proofs and other forms of structural integration; in Teece’s 
words, they must “let chaos reign” and “rein in chaos.” 
     The second lesson, related to the first, is that self-organizing processes are not self-
organizing. Just as there is nothing as rehearsed as skillful improvisation, there is nothing as 
designed as an effective self-organizing process. Traditional theories of organization have 
correctly insisted that a company must map its structural differentiation onto the diversity of its 
external environments, and must adopt mechanisms to integrate the company into a cohesive 
whole. Dynamic environments magnify these imperatives, requiring a continuous commitment 
to design, planning, and monitoring, and continuous adaptation of organizational structures and 
processes. Polyarchy without integration leads to chaos, and the new architectures fail when 
managers leave structural integration to unconscious forces and self-organizing processes. 
     Finally, we believe that the theory of dynamic capabilities gives support to the notion that 
companies must align market strategies with internal structures. The theory of dynamic 
capabilities is far from perfect, as many authors have pointed out.46 However the theory reminds 
us – in a tradition that stretches back to Alfred Chandler, Peter Drucker, Igor Ansoff, and 
others – that competitive environments are always changing, and that one of the most essential 
functions of executive leadership is to align organizational capabilities with opportunities in the 
marketplace. In a world of turbulent markets, this means creating dynamic capabilities for 
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sensing, shaping, and seizing new opportunities, and creating new structures matched to the 
realities of the global competitive landscape. 
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Figure 1: Chaos and Folly in  
Organizational Design 
FOLLY 
(Stifled  
innovation) 
Differentiation: The extent to which the organization maps onto the full diversity of  its 
environment by establishing  specialized individuals or sub-units at its boundaries, and giving them 
autonomy to solve problems and capture opportunities. 
 
Integration: The extent to which the organization implements processes for converting distributed  
information into collective intellect.  
INSULARITY 
(Inadequate 
Information) 
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Sidebar: 
Quorum Sensing in Nature 
 
Human beings are not alone in possessing highly-evolved intuitions for social 
consensus. Many animals in nature use what is called “quorum sensing” as a 
mechanism for harnessing collective wisdom and making crucial choices, such as 
where to nest or where to hunt. 
 
For example, ants do not choose nesting locations by sending a single scout or 
small group on reconnaissance, but send roughly 30% of the population to sense 
the environment and recruit others to the most promising sites. The social 
threshold or tipping point for action – that is, when everyone knows to move to 
the new location – occurs when a critical mass or “quorum” of ants begins 
migrating to a preferred site. Mathematical models show that a collective 
decision process based on quorum sensing produces better decisions than other 
methods, showing the importance of social information processing in the animal 
kingdom.  
 
For an excellent review of the literature on social animals, decision making and 
behavior, see David Sumpter’s (2010) Collective Animal Behavior, Princeton 
University Press.  
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Sidebar:  
Putting Dynamic Capabilities into Practice 
 
    Does your company think beyond baseline capabilities and conventional sources of 
competitive advantage? Does your organization structure facilitate continuous innovation and 
the capacity to sense, shape and seize new market opportunities? Concepts like polyarchy and 
social proofs lend themselves to launching a bold challenge to any company’s approach to 
strategy and innovation. Below is a checklist for fundamentally rethinking a company’s 
capabilities for sensing, shaping and seizing opportunities.  
 
Sensing 
    ☐  Where does knowledge about new technologies and market opportunities   
              reside in the organization? How do we capture it? 
    ☐ What kinds of opportunities lend themselves to dispersed sensing rather than    
              top management opportunity search? Do we make this distinction? 
    ☐ Who are our “sensers”? Who – inside or outside the organization – is best  
              positioned to foresee new market opportunities? 
    ☐ What incentives and rewards would motivate sensers to identify opportunities?  
    ☐  How can we encourage people to share new ideas with others? 
    ☐ How can the organization engage external customers (or potential customers)  
              in sensing new opportunities? Can we “crowdsource” new ideas? 
 
Shaping 
        ☐  Do we have enough knowledge and expertise to shape the direction of  
              technologies or product innovations? If so, who has it? If not, can we get it? 
        ☐  How can we encourage our people to think boldly and creatively about the  
              future direction of the marketplace? 
        ☐  Does our culture induce people to produce the kinds of new ideas that shape  
              markets? If not, why not? If so, how do we capture these ideas? 
    ☐  Do we have mechanisms for testing new ideas – eg, pilot tests, experiments? 
        ☐  Do we have processes to facilitate learning from the market?  
    ☐  How can we encourage people to capture the “wisdom of the crowd”? How  
              can we use external crowds to shape new market opportunities? 
 
Seizing 
    ☐ How many truly novel opportunities have we seized in the past 18 months? 
        ☐ Who decides which opportunities we seize? 
    ☐ What rules do we use for project investment decisions? To what extent do  
              they capture the knowledge of the whole organization? 
        ☐  Suppose we had a “rule of three”. How would people respond? What 
              problems would it create? How could we harness the creativity? 
        ☐ Is there another rule that would suit our culture better yet incentivize  
              dispersed innovation and social convergence?  
 
     In volatile markets, the key function of senior managers is to create a fertile environment for 
sensing, shaping and seizing market opportunities. The above questions form the basis for 
deeper and more probing conversations about strategy, innovation, and organizing for dynamic 
capabilities. 
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